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Domestic Relations-1961 Tennessee Survey (II)
William I. Harbison*
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I. ADOPTION OF CHMDEN
The definition of "abandonment" within the meaning of the Tennessee
adoption statutes was clarified in the case of Ex parte Wolfenden. 1 The
stepmother of the subject child filed a petition for adoption, joined in and
consented to by the natural father. A cross-petition was filed by the child's
uncle and his wife, seeking to adopt the child and alleging that the natural
father had abandoned the child and had delivered her to the home of the
uncle for permanent rearing. The circuit judge granted the cross-petition
upon the ground that adoption by the uncle was for the best interest of the
child. He expressly declined to find whether there had been an abandonment by the natural father, deeming this fact immaterial. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded the case for further findings on this point.
The appellate court held that in the absence of consent by the natural
parent, an adoption cannot be granted without a decree of abandonment.2
The court held, however, that in this regard the trial judge was not bound
by a statutory definition of an "abandoned child" found in the adoption
law.3 This statute provides that any child under eighteen years of age
who has been willfully abandoned for four consecutive months or more
prior to institution of proceedings to declare an abandonment is deemed
to be abandoned. The court of appeals stated that this narrow definition
was confined to abandonment proceedings and was not necessarily the
test to be applied in adoption cases. Otherwise, a parent could within
four months of the adoption proceedings take steps inconsistent with
abandonment and render the courts powerless to grant adoptions. The
broader test of "a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims" was adopted as a rule to be followed in
adoption cases.
*Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Trabue, Minick, Sturdivant &
Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 349 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-108 to -126 (Supp. 1961).
3. TENN. CoDEANN. § 36-102(5) (1956).
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Upon, the remand of -this case the trial court found that there- had in
fact been an abandonment by the father, but again the court of appeals
reversed, holding that the evidence did not sustain this finding.4 The court
pointed out that clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence must be offered to sustain a finding that a natural parent has abandohed his child.
The fact that the child might be better situated in a foster home was held
not to be a controlling factor in an adoption case. Carefully reviewing the
evidence, the court concluded that the natural father had not been guilty
of abandonment. It pointed out that this holding did not settle the questions of custody of the child, visitation rights, and the like, in all of which
the best interests of the child could be considered, and indicated that the
trial court might well leave custody of the child with the foster parents if
her welfare could best be served in this way. The court said: "It may well
be that many children would be better off in other homes-but that is not,
and never has been, a ground for adoption. This is an adoption proceeding;
not a custody determination."5
In the case of In re Adoption of Edman,6 the court of appeals held
that an adoption could not be granted without the consent of the guardian
ad litem of an incompetent natural parent. The court applied literally the
terms of the adoption statutes to the effect that a guardian ad litem shall
7
be appointed for an incompetent parent "to give or withhold consent."
The court held that the giving of consent was a choice which should not
be exercised by the courts, and that if the guardian ad litem withheld
consent, the adoption simply could not proceed; if the incompetent parent
should ever be restored he, of course, would then be in a position to give
or withhold consent personally. Again, the fact that the adoption might be
for the best interest of the child was held not to be a controlling factor.
II. DxvoRcE

AND AmLImONY

1. Grounds of Divorce.-Despite the apparent desirability of terminating
the marriage, statutory grounds for divorce were held not proved in the
case of Greene v. Greene.8 On a previous appeal of this case,9 the court of
appeals had ordered a remand for further proof as to grounds of divorce.
Upon the remand, the evidence revealed that the parties had been married
in 1948 but had not lived together since 1951. During most of the time
since 1951 the husband had been confined to a hospital in Tennessee and
4. Ex parte Wolfenden, 348 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1961).
5. 348 S.W.2d at 757.
6. 348 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
7. TENN.CODE Aaer. § 36-108 (Supp. 1961).
8. 349 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960)..
9. Greene v. Greene, 43 Tenn. App. 411, 309 S.W.2d -403 (W.S. 1957), noted in
Harbison, Domestic Relations-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 Vmn. L. REv. 1259, 1262
(1958).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 15

had been totally disabled. His wife and child lived in Wisconsin, and he
had not contributed to their support, although part of his disability benefits
had been sent to them by allottment. Although the husband charged desertion, cruelty and refusal of the wife to reside with him in Tennessee, none
of these charges was found to be sustained by the proof. The court of
appeals stated that in reality there was no marriage between the parties,
no hope of reconciliation, and that the wife had contested the action entirely for economic reasons. However, since Tennessee has no statute authorizing divorce merely upon proof of separation for a specified period,
the court found no authority for granting relief. The court suggested the
possible desirability of a statute permitting divorce upon proof of a prolonged separation, regardless of fault, as provided in the codes of several
other states.10
2. Alimony.-In the case of Prichardv. Carter," the terms of an alimony
decree were construed. The husband and wife had owned a joint life
estate in a five-acre tract of land on which they resided at the time of their
divorce. The divorce decree divested out of the husband and into the
wife "the title to the homestead which is now held jointly by the parties,
as life tenants." The decree described said "homestead" by boundaries
and referred to it as a five-acre tract worth approximately one thousand
dollars. Title to all furnishings "in the family residence on said homestead" was also given to the wife.
After the death of his former wife, the husband brought the present
suit, claiming title to the property for the remainder of his life. He
contended that the only right which had been given to the wife by the
divorce decree was the statutory homestead right which is vested in the
husband during marriage 2 and which may be transferred to the wife upon
divorce. 13 This statutory right is an exemption of one thousand dollars
worth of realty from claims of creditors. Contending that only this limited
interest had been transferred to the wife, the husband insisted that upon
her death his original life estate in the property became operative.
Both the chancellor and the supreme court rejected this contention. The
courts held that the term "homestead" as used in the decree referred to
the entire tract of land and that it was not used in a technical sense or
with reference to the statutory exemption. The statutory exemption can
exist only in land owned by the husband in his own name, 14 and in this
10. E.g., Kr. REv. STAT. § 403.020(1)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1961) (living apart
without cohabitation for five consecutive years made ground for divorce to either
party).
11. 348 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1961).
12. TENN. CODE AN. § 26-301 (1956).
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-824 (1956).
14. Kellar v.Kellar, 142 Tenn. 524, 221 S.W. 189 (1920); Case Co. v. Joyce, 89
Tenn. 337, 16 S.W. 147 (1890).
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case the husband and wife had been given a joint life estate by the original
deed. Consequently the husband had no statutory "homestead" right in
this property, and the divorce court had evidently intended the term to
mean the entire tract upon which the couple and their children resided.
III. PARENT A
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1. Dependency in Workmen's Compensation Cases.-In the case of
Atkins v. Employers Mutual Insurance Co.,15 children of the decedent's
"common-law" wife were held entitled to share in death benefits under the
Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act, along with a legitimate child
of the decedent. The two children and their mother had been living in
the home of the deceased for some time before his death, and he had
claimed the children as dependents for income tax purposes. He had
contributed to their support, so that a finding of actual dependency was
justified. Under these circumstances the holding seems correct, inasmuch
as actual dependency has long been held to be the test for unrelated
children under the compensation law.16 The meretricious relationship between the mother of the children and the deceased was properly held not
7
to be imputed to the children to their detriment.'
15. 347 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1961).
16. Wilmoth v. Phoenix Util. Co., 168 Tenn. 95, 75 S.W.2d 48 (1934); Memphis
Fertilizer Co. v. Small, 160 Tenn. 235, 22 S.W.2d 1037 (1930); Kinnard v. Tenn.
Chem. Co., 157. Tenn. 206, 7 S.W.2d 807 (1928).
17. Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 185 Cal. 200, 196 Pac.
257 (1921); Campton v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Utah 571, 151 P.2d 189 (1944).

